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Abstract 
This paper presents the most important aspects of up-to-date compmerised solution of the 
remote controlling for traffic especially for the railway (railroad) application. There will be 
discussed the hard;\'are and software components and the questions of data transmission. 
The paper deals with the theoretical and practical methods of fail-safe realization of the 
instrument and communication. 
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1. Introduction 
On the lines of the '\IAv (Hungarian Raihvay Company) there is a great 
demand for a high safety computer controlled traffic system operating with-
out traffic personnel at the smali raihvav stations. Toda';' all the technical 
conditions ~re given for this. According to our idea, tr~ffic control would 
be ensured by the train service of the nearest station with the help of an 
up-to-date, simple and reliable computerised remote control system. This 
article deals first with the theoretical aspects of the hard\vare and software 
elements needed for the development. of this system. Second, we investigate 
the requirements of safety regarding the computerized system. 
2. Goal of Development 
Our aim is to develop the hardware and software elements required for the 
realization of the above goal on the basis of fail-safe principle. In addition, 
the following are to be developed: a safe data transfer system, a simple but 
"This subject has been elaborated in detail in connection with the MA v-orvrFB project 
by the author in J 996. 
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Fig. 1. The logical scheme of the remote controller 
clear and handy operating surface, an emergency executive computer sys-
tem, and last but not least, a program system complying with the principle 
of diversity (independent programming) . 
Those solutions which are independent of the actual station interlock-
ing system should be examined. 
The technical, testing and operation procedures for the safe operation 
should be elaborated, too. 
3. Brief Description of the Original Principle 
The operation of the system is based on the fail-safe principle of the multi 
computer system. This solution is encouraged today by the relatively low 
price of the high capability industria! microcomputers. Today a 2-out-of-3 
or a 2-out-of-2 redundant fail-safe system can be implemented at a techni-
cally reasonable price. Earlier, in the era of traditional mainframes, these 
solutions represented a very expensive answer to the problem, so they could 
not have been afforded as devices for overcontroI. 
Today, in contrast, it is rather the salaries of the traffic personnel that 
incur high costs, therefore it became urgent to find a computerized solution 
to the problem. 
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4. Hardware Elements 
For the realization of research Oil a laboratory level, as well as for the execu-
tion of safety and reliability examinations with the minimal configuration, 
the building of a system is required which includes four Advantech or Opto 
22 industrial computers. Among them, one of the computers functions as a 
remote control station which uses a color, high resolution, 20" screen. An-
other computer performs the function of communication, while the other 
two serye as logical and safety channels. 
The task of the system is to control the traffic of the controlled station 
without staff on the ;pot. The commandf come from the nearest staffed 
station. The job of the two sides is explained in Fig. 1. The bold text 
indicates the faii-safe t~ks. 
In the course of development a number of problems raised can be an-
swered. First of all, the joint reliability and safety investigations into the 
complex system consisting of tradit~onal relayed devices and the most up-to-
date microprocessor-equipped computers can provide valuable results. The 
operation of such mixed equipment will still be required for long decades in 
the field of t.he guided land transport. 
These specialisTs, in turn, can make good use of their knowledge ac-
quired during academic years, for the solution to many transport automaTion 
problems. 
The problem of documentation (handling registration or registration of 
performed operations) should be solved on the side of both the transmitter 
and receiver. 
The graphic man-machine interface should be implemented in accor-
dance \\'ith the ~vIA V. To this end, the layout of station topography with 
security display should be studied, which is already made available by dif-
e t j~ I£' 1 S' ·\1' J Q 'b 1\·1·\\; BV\' t \ reren" Hms i,lor examp,e lemens,: .catb, "as] ,~" h. , ~\..' 1 ec.). 
The most compatible 'Nay of connecting the outputs of the computer 
to the relay equipment should be found with the use of high reliability 
miniature industrial relays. 
One possible solution of the hardware is shown in Fig. 2. 
5. Software Elements 
There is a requirement that the software should be modular, and these 
modules must be as small as possible. The development of the software 
begins with the system plan, in which the functional description of the 
individual modules and their interfaces to other modules should be clearly 
defined. 
Applying independent programming is enabled by hardware redun-
dancy. The fail-safe feature can be achieved by the application of these 
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two factors together. Safety considerations ra.ise the following requirements 
against the software: 
€) The first step of software design is the modular system plan. This 
includes the detailed analysis of the requirement book and the division 
of the task into smaller functional modules. 
@ It is necessary to elaborate the mutual acts of the individual modules. 
The modular interfaces should also be precisely defined. 
® The communica.tion bet\veen the individ ual modules can be realized 
by the separated memory. The best \-vay of intertask communication 
is by pointer passing. The use of global variables should be avoided. 
€) The working of the software shall be demonstrated by flmvcharts that 
depict the interfaces of each module to other modules. Also, detailed 
flowcharts shall be made of the internal workings of modules where 
description is necessary on the statement level. 
@ All modules should be testable individually. The interfaces shall be 
simulated. 
® Individual modules, even in the worst case, must never stop the run-
ning of the kernel program. vVhen a module depends on external 
events timers should be used to have time-outs that limit the \vaiting 
on the events. 
® It is advisable to avoid the use of interrupts. 
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@ Writing recursive segments should also be avoided. 
€I The use of multitasking operating systems is not recommended either, 
since it makes the proof of safety very difficult. 
® The depth of segment calling should be limited. Return to the kernel 
program often gives higher safety than the application of highly nested 
segments. 
€! The commonly used data base must be handled as a file, but the 
individual modules can work on their own buffers, common data base 
can be modified only by the kernel program according to the contents 
of the individual buffers. 
€I To increase safety the common data base can be duplicated. \iVhen 
there is difference between the data base and the shadow. the kernel 
initiates a refreshing cycle. 
® The state of data base must be refreshed cyclically depending on the 
state characteristics of the remote station. 
@ For storage of the data base non-volatile memory (EEPROM, FLASH 
RAyI, etc ... ) should be used. 
The diversity is given by two independent programs having the same 
input, and calculating the outputs. They also cakulate the state tables (ac-
tual data base) independent of each other. The results should be compared 
by a third program. 
Keyboard 
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Diary 
~lodule 
",---';-pr-il-lti-Ilf,-' ..., 
Fig. j. The structure of the remote control software 
Fig. 3 shows the functional structure of the remote control software. 
6. Data Communication 
The fail-safe data communication system can be realized by application of a 
hierarchical system. This is defined in the ISO international pattern seven 
layer model but we suggest the usage of the simplified model for railway 
purposes, as shown in Fig. 4. This can be found in the ORE recommendation 
l.5':ijRP 10 (see references). 
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Due to the nrcessary safety errors discovered at the lo\\'er layer have to 
be corrected at a higher layer. For example, errors occurred during decoding 
should not be corrected immediately by using complicated error correction 
codes which make the error disappear, because in this case the system has 
no information about the deterioration of the communication line, If there 
are multiple errors that even the error correction code cannot fix, the data 
transmission will collapse without any previous v;arning. If the error is regis-
tered by the protocol, and the correction takes place using data transmission 
repetition, then the system continuously has information about the quality 
of the data line and can do the necessary steps (call upon maintenance in 
time) . 
Safety is based on error discO\'ering. That is why we must select cod-
ification, at which any data corruption interference will not be hidden, in 
other words. will be discovered. 
This covering method is relatively complicated, the reader can find 
more details in other articles. 
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7. Protection Against Errors 
In this section we discuss the questions of safety. The most important 
question is how the undesirable effects of errors can be avoided. This process 
includes many steps starting from the design, through the realization, to 
the operation and the maintenance. We briefly discuss the requirements 
connection with the hardware, software and the operation. 
The theoretical and practical aspects of the safety can be described 
according to Fig. 5 as follows. 
The protection against errors is divided into two parts: 
@ The design, where it must be ensured that it is i:1 accordance \·:ith 
the functional requirements on which it is based. 
<!i) The operation, where it must be ensured that the consequences of 
externa! actions to which the remote contra! system IS exposed meet 
a specific requirement. 
The proof of the fail-safe nature of the design is divided into two classes. 
which are in turn divided according to their nature: 
<!i) Correctness of production: 
For software the program correctness: For hardware, correctness 
of production is ensured by inspection of the hard\vare to verify 
equivalence with the product documentation. 
1i} Functional correctness: 
For software functional completeness is defined as the sum of 
functional correctness, correct error response, completeness and 
freedom from side effects: For hardware the same definitions are 
llsed but without freedom from side effects. 
Safet~· during operation is divided into three safety classes: 
® Defective components, i.e. that a component has not functioned as 
intended from a given point of time on. 
@ Interferences, i.e. that for external reasons a component is assigned 
an incorrect value, although the component's function is not otherwise 
affected. 
® Communication error, i.e. that during transmission between two com-
puters data are corrupted or delayed so much that the requirements 
concerning correct reaction \vithin a specific time interval cannot be 
met. 
7.1. Safety Requirements 
In the following \ve summarize the most important requirements concerning 
safety. 
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F£g. 5. The logical scheme of the protection against errors 
7.2. Definitions and Assumptions 
Definition: If a system consists of two or more hardware sections which 
have the property that a single error in one section, together with 
a random single error in the other section, cannot cause together a 
dangerous error, these two sections are called error seg/'ega/.ed. 
Definition: Extensive use is made of the safety principle that one function 
group monitors another or that the activities of two function groups 
which, when functioning correctly, must result in identical results, 
are compared and thus monitored by a third function group. In the 
following the two function groups whose activity is monitored by one 
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Fig. 6 Calculation of mean error detection time 
of i:hese closely related methods, are denoted by A and B. 
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The time that elapses between two consenltive monitorings is called 
monitoring period, denoted by lv! P. 
Assumption: In the design proofs for the individual hardware sections it 
is demonstrated that an error E occurring in the function group A 
will be detected within the monitoring period provided an error has 
not occurred in the monitoring function group B, or another error in 
function group A, during the same period 'vhich prevents detection of 
the first error. 
If "uch error E is detected, the system is brought iItto a safe .state, so 
that the error cannot have any dangerous consequences. 
Assumption: An error is assumed to occur at random within a monitoring 
period, which means that the error detection time is the average of 
the shortest and the longest time from occurrence of an error until the 
system has been brought into a safe state, as shown in Fig. 6. 
The average is called the mean error detection time and is denoted by K. 
which can thus be calculated according to the next expression: 
K = 0 .. 5 *- ,'vIP-+- RT . 
Definition: The mean error detection time is explicitly given for each of 
the error segregated hardware sections. The mean error detection time 
for the i- th section is denoted by Ki. 
Assumption: Calculations of data and inverted data which are staggered 
in time are treated as two function groups. In other words, interference 
that affects both data and inverted data in the same error critical 
direction is regarded as two errors. 
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7.3. Protection Against Single Errors 
The system has to fulfill the next requirements: 
RSl. A single error and any consequential error must not be dangerous. 
Single error safety will be demonstrated by defining possible single er-
rors in the design proof for the hardware sections in \vhich there are 
safety critical components. The design proof contains the argumenta-
tion showing that these single errors cannot be dangerous. 
RS2. In design it is necessary to apply the principle of error segregated 
hardware sections. 
RS3. If two function groups, A ancl. B monitor each other. the probability 
of an error in A or B within et given tim.e unit (TU) must meet the 
following requirement: 
in A Of B) < 
"\Ve mention. that in pract:ce if three or four hardware sections are used for 
mutual monitoring, the requirement concerning the probability of d.. danger-
ous combination of errors in a monitoring period is the same as if only two 
sections are used for mutua! monitoring. 
7.4. Protection Against Multiple EiTors 
This part contains ?en explanation of the method used to calculate ho"" mul-
tiple errors in t he form of interference and defecti\·e componeEts affect the 
safety of the planned system. The system has to fulfill the next require-
ments: 
RwIl. \Vhen the first eITor occurs, the system must move into a safe state. 
The time elapsing from occurrence of this first error until a safe state 
has been established is called the error detection time (see above). 
Rl\12. When the first error has occurred, the probability of further errors 
occurring during the error detection time which, together with the 
first error, are dangerous, should be less than 10-8 . 
RlvIS. The dangerous error frequency in the whole system, regarding all 
error segregated sections, must be less than once per 105 operating 
vear. 
RIvI4: The dangerous error frequency, supposing n error segregated hard-
ware sections can be calculated according the next expression 
l.:{(P(error in A or B)/TU)2tK,;}. 
i=1 
iThis value is established by the DSB (Danish State Bahn) 
!This value is established by the DSB (Danish State Bahn) 
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8, Software Independence 
This section contains an interpretation of the requirements concerning in-
dependent programrning, which should be used in the fail safe-system. 
In the error critical parts of the software there are two types of pro-
tection against error where software independence is used: 
assurance th'lt the program source code used for arguing functional 
correctness are correctly compiled: 
@c assurance that there is accordance between the definition of a function 
actually performed, i.e. equivalence between design definition and 
program source code. 
1. P7'Ogrmnming ,'i;Jethod 
This section describes the scope and methods of independent programming, 
which is called ABC programming method. This method is able to fulfil! 
the requirements relating to PROAl correctness and equivalence (equivalence 
with the estimated content). 
The PROM (P~ogrammable Read Only ::Vlemory) holds the target code 
of the program. The source program compilation is performed error-free if 
the decompilecl program is congruent with the original source program. 
This applies provided an error in a compiling tool cannot be cancelled 
out by the same error in the decompiling too!. This is ensured by using 
ABC independent compiler/decompiler. 
If the program proof includes active testing, both the test procedure 
and the testing tools must be ABC independent of the program. 
The ABC programming is interpreted as follows: 
Let APR be a program made by the person(s) A. 
Let BPR be a verification program made by the person(s) B. 
C is a person who co-ordinates the work of A and B. 
D is the appro\'ing person(s). 
The work of A, B ar,d C is the following: 
e A and C must prepare the specification together. When the speci-
fication has been completed D must certify that it does not contain 
implementation details. Only then B starts the actual implementation 
1,york. 
@ A and B must not \lse the same computers and tools. 
@ A must not prepare anything in BP R and vice versa. 
e A must not speak or write with B on any matter concerning the 
work/solution of the task. 
More requirements in connection with the tools: 
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€I If the compilers used by A and B are not explicitly documented as 
ABC assured, A and B shall use compilers from different origin. 
® Both A and B state which libraries they are using, C shall provide 
proof that these are of different origin. 
€I If A or B uses program parts that have not been made specially for 
this project, both A and B shall explain which libraries and collec-
tions of algorithms they are using. C shall establish that these are 
of different origin. When this principle is applied, A and B can use 
related languages. as for example language C and C++. 
" The best solution is when the programming language of AP R is dif-
ferent from the language of BPR. For example A uses the PASCAL 
language, while B uses the C language. 
Requirements relating to the communication bet\\'een the participants of the 
project. 
@) All exchange of information between A and B must take place via C 
in traceable form. 
;iF R shall be tested bv C and A. without B. 
@ BPR shall be tested b\r C and B without A. 
Cl If the result B's work is test result, C must compare this result of the 
test with the specification for AP R approved by D. If C discovers any 
divergence between test and specification, then: 
if the divergence is due to an error in the specification, C sh all 
correct this and pass it to A. and B. 
if there is an error that can be attributed to either A or B, then 
C shall pass information about the error on to both A and B 
without deciding where r%ponsibility for the error lies. 
® The above shall be checked by D. 
In this description we do not deal \vith the alteration procedure relating to 
the hardware or software. 
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